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Solving the Challenges to World Trade
Steve Charnovitz*

World trade faces fundamental challenges. This essay examines six threats to
the intellectual case for open trade: to wit, worries about ecology, fairness,
morality, equity, security, and geopolitics. Together, these threats implicate a
huge swath of international trade. One of the biggest indicators of diminishing
support for trade is the moribund status of the leading institution of the trading
system, the World Trade Organization (WTO). There are three branches of
WTO governance and all three are in trouble: the judicial branch and its
vacant Appellate Body, the executive branch and its vacant post of WTO
Director-General, and the legislative branch where the WTO Ministerial
Conference has failed to meet since 2017. Solving global problems often
requires focused international policies and sometimes specialized
international agencies to administer such policies. Unfortunately, during the
21st century, the growth in international problems has not been matched by a
growth in international solutions. The faltering of the trading system is one
example of that mismatch, but the same pathology exists in many areas of
global governance. The biggest problem may be the shallow Paris Agreement
on Climate Change that lacks any mutually agreed commitments, such as a
carbon tax, for harmonized actions to combat global warming. Yet even
without any international commitment to impose a carbon tax on domestic
commerce, there are political demands to impose carbon taxes on imported
products for ecological and fairness reasons. This essay introduces the term
“tradeclimate” questions as nomenclature for the set of environmental issues
relating to transborder trade that should be resolved in the climate regime, not
in the WTO. In discussing China, the essay notes that the trade war between
China and the United States spills into the WTO, and explains why the WTO
should not arrogate to itself the task of re-educating China. Gaining China’s
cooperation is critical to achieving better policies in the WTO, the Paris
Agreement, and the World Health Organization.

World trade faces fundamental challenges. While the social and economic benefits
gained through exchange have been apparent to humans since antiquity, the litany of political
complaints about cross-border commerce may be more extensive and louder than ever before.
As always, the market recognizes the importance of international trade to prosperity. Yet many
politicians express doubt as to when participation in international trade enhances the national
interest.
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One of the biggest indicators of diminishing support for trade is the moribund status of
the leading institution of the trading system, the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva.
There are three branches of WTO governance and all three are in trouble: The Trump
Administration has discombobulated the judicial branch by refusing to agree to new judges for
the Appellate Body. The post of the WTO Director-General, who heads the executive branch,
has been vacant since August 2020. The topmost body of the WTO’s legislative branch, the
Ministerial Conference, has failed to meet since 2017. Overall, the WTO’s decrepitude
demonstrates “constitutional failure.”
Globalization and the governance of globalization will survive. The transborder
movement of goods, services, capital, technology, and people will survive because most
countries are not attracted to the deprivation that would be entailed by an alternative strategy of
national (or subnational) self-sufficiency. The WTO will (probably) also survive now that the
Trump Administration will soon pack its bags. The WTO survives because lawmakers and
influential economic and social actors on the world stage know that international law and
international rules are needed to restrain beggar-thy-neighbor trade politics. Around the world,
many countries continue to be interested in enhancing mutual commitments to deepen trade ties
as reflected most recently in the November 2020 signing of the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP)
The underperformance of the WTO, of course, is hardly the biggest policy dysfunction on
Earth. Our biggest problems include an unchecked viral pandemic, worsening global warming,
widespread poverty, and a proliferation of nuclear ballistics in states with malign intentions. As
governments address such conditions, a basic question arises as to whether international trade is
part of the solution or part of the problem.
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Seventy-five years ago, the conventional wisdom was that trade was part of the solution
for peace1, economic growth, and social development. In my view, that conventional wisdom
remains convincing today. Yet the dialectics of the cosmopolitan conversation have led to
reassessments of many economic, social, and political practices within each society and between
countries. Are existing trade patterns supportive of solutions to the most pressing problems
facing the planet? Under what conditions does trade undermine optimal solutions, especially to
the challenges of global warming and underemployment?
Although trade per se is conceptually distinct from the international supervision of trade
policies, these two phenomena are difficult to disentangle. Voluntary international trade makes
traders better off and so too does global commerce enhance the wealth of nations. The freedom
to engage in transnational commerce promotes social progress and enables bottom-up prosperity.
Nevertheless, from Aristotle onward, some trade theorists have argued for economic autarky and
other top-down controls over individual liberty and transborder exchange. Acting on the
evidence that international trade enriches societies, leading publicists have championed
intellectual justifications for free trade — in the 16th century Hugo Grotius, in the 17th century
Dudley North, in the 18th century Adam Smith, and in the 19th century David Ricardo.
Nevertheless, those liberal philosophies were often ignored by political arguments that
states have a right to and should control trade in order to promote mercantilist, diplomatic,
industrial or security objectives. Yet the domestic political debate on trade, however edifying,
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The WTO is to be commended for its “Trade for Peace” program begun in 2017, see
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/tradeforpeace_e.htm.
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was necessarily imperfect and incomplete because other countries (the other side of the
transaction) were not equal participants in that debate. To gain the greatest benefits from
mutual market access, the political debate on trade has to occur on two levels, the
international and the domestic.
Recognizing the enduring benefits of allowing trade to cross political boundaries, states
have, for many centuries, utilized commercial treaties as a tactic for overcoming anticompetitive tendencies in domestic politics. After World War I, leading governments took the
first steps to construct a multilateral trading system based on law. The post-World War II trade
negotiations created the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 which
established presumptions in favor of reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers and eliminating
trade discrimination.
In 1994, the GATT was transformed into the WTO legal system by the major trading
nations. The WTO strengthened the institutional support for “open, market-oriented policies”2,
non-discrimination, limits on government subsidies, and respect for intellectual property. But
even so, the leading governments in the WTO (especially the United States) never renounced or
abandoned state-led protectionism, mercantilism, industrial policy, and discrimination against
unfavored nations. Since an international organization cannot be more virtuous than its
Member States, there were always limits to how much the WTO could accomplish in tearing
down the walls separating national economies.

2

The WTO’s orientation toward “open, market-oriented policies” is noted in the Preamble to the GATT’s Marrakesh
Declaration of 1994.
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The Six Threats to World Trade
Although international trade tends to make participating countries better off than they
would be without international trade, not everyone in each country is better off. The need for a
social net underlying international trade was appreciated by the founders of the Bretton Woods
institutions. Unfortunately, the skeletal legal provisions on employment and development in the
1948 Charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO) were never planted into the GATT
or into the WTO. In my view, that omission was a “breach of social contract” by the world
trading system. And that breach has led, in part, to the crumbling of the system’s intellectual
foundations that we see in the current political debate about the WTO.
Yet it is not just the multilateral trade institutions that are under assault. World trade
itself is being challenged on six grounds: (1) ecological, (2) competitive fairness, (3) morality,
(4) equity, (5) national security, and (6) geopolitical imbalance. This essay briefly discusses
each of the six threats and then turns to a more detailed look at ecological challenges.
The first threat is to question the ecological impact of trade with a country that pursues
less ambitious environmental policies. This debate on the environmental integrity of
international trade is relatively recent, commencing only to the early 1970s. The initial focus
was on local environmental problems of pollution control. Around the time the GATT’s
Uruguay Round went into high gear, a greater consciousness about the quintessentially global
problem of climate change rendered the potential negative cross-border effects of trade more
salient than ever before. Given the need to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, an
expansion of production and trade in any country not reducing emissions could worsen global
warming. In contrast to local environmental problems, where the trade connection is third order,
global environmental problems can elevate trade to a second or first order concern.
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Trade becomes impossible to ignore if carbon-neutral domestic production is displaced
by imported products whose production and/or exportation generates a lot more CO2. Moreover,
if production relocates from a country with strict climate regulations to a country with lax
climate regulations, this movement of production (and investment) is said to a spur a “leakage”
of emissions. Other global environmental goals, especially biodiversity, can be directly affected
by international trade. From the beginnings of international environmental policy in the late 19th
century (e.g., mammal trophies and bird feathers), international trade has been recognized as a
driver of harm. As a consequence, some of the earliest environmental treaties employed trade
controls as an instrument of environmental regulation.
The bedrock principle in the trading system has been that otherwise identical goods that
differ only by the “process or production method” (PPM) used to obtain them are still “like”
products and therefore qualify for the treatment required for like products. For example, “green
steel” made using clean energy is a like product to “brown” steel made using energy from fossil
fuels. And that likeness generates a presumption in trade law that an importing government
should not treat the green and brown steel differently.3
Yet this “like product” principle is in tension with longtime trends in environmental
policy which look more dynamically at goods to take into account the production and
consumption footprint. Whenever the “like product” principle gets challenged by unilateral
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My pre-WTO scholarship questioned the legality validity of that presumption. See, for example, Steve Charnovitz,
“Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GATT Rules and Their Application to Environmental Trade Measures.” Tulane
Environmental Law Journal (1994); “Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate,” Cornell
International Law Journal (1994). But the GATT and WTO caselaw since then has not abandoned the “like product”
presumption with regard to GATT Articles I and III. My early scholarship also noted that the GATT has important
general exceptions that could be used to overturn that presumption for national environmental laws based on
PPM distinctions. For example, see Steve Charnovitz, “Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX,”
Journal of World Trade (1991). WTO caselaw has borne out my hopeful prediction.
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governmental actions, in the name of the environment, to impose “border tax adjustments,”
“carbon tariffs” or “border carbon adjustments,” then the basic expectations of “governments and
traders”4 in market relations get destabilized. Improvements in technology worsen the tension
because the traditional understanding that a product as such is mute about its provenance and life
cycle is now conceptually under reconstruction. Using specialized verification and tracing
mechanisms5, PPM labeling of traded goods is becoming feasible.
The second threat is to question the competitive fairness of trade transactions between
countries with differing economic and regulatory policies. Such “level playing field” arguments
for protectionism go back centuries with different packaging. In recent years, the most popular
packaging is that market-friendly countries cannot successfully compete with market-unfriendly
countries that make use of nationalistic policies of state ownership, state control, state subsidies,
and state planning. Or, in other words, the narrative is that non-market economies have a selfconstructed competitive advantage over market economies. Such narratives are put forward
without any apparent embarrassment in viewing “market economy status” as an albatross.
Even between countries that enjoy market economies, there will still be asymmetries in
how capitalism is bridled. That is, governments will always differ in how they regulate, tax, and
subsidize market participants — either to address market failure, promote public goods,
redistribute income, or pay for government. Such differences are often pointed to as rendering
“unfair” the proverbial trade “playing field.” Any divergence in the way that one country
intervenes in its market compared to how another country intervenes can elicit “unfairness”

4

GATT Article X:1.

5

See Amy K. Lehr, “New Approaches to Supply Chain Traceability,” CSIS (2020).
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claims “on the export or the import side.” Unfairness claims can also arise from individual
private actor decisions (e.g., inter-country price discrimination) with effects in foreign markets.
The third threat is to question the morality of trade between countries whose legal
systems manifest different attitudes about human dignity. When governments refuse democracy,
abridge basic political rights, outlaw labor unions, or engage in corruption, then the citizens of
other countries can adopt the view that trade and economic cooperation exploits foreign workers
and citizens. Such outwardly-directed moral consumerism has existed for centuries, but with
global communication (and affluence) the voices are amplified now. This unhappiness with
what’s going on inside foreign countries triggers sympathetic domestic unhappiness which gets
mediated through domestic policymakers who seek to regulate trade for moral reasons.
The sense of domestic responsibility for affairs in foreign countries gets more focused
when identifiable traded goods are produced in an “odious” way, such as a commodity produced
with forced labor. Seen in this way, moral values get integrated into the value chain.
Multilateral controls on “odious trade” go back to the early 20th century in the episode of the
regulation of phosphorus matches.
Moral repercussions in trade play out in complex ways. For example, the Opium Trade
of the 1830s between the British East India Company and China (opium for tea) led to many
harmful effects in China that still reverberate today. The moral and economic aspects of trade
being incommensurate means that they cannot be predictably weighed against each together.
Once the morality of trade is superimposed onto the economy of trade, then the disutility of both
imports and exports can be recalculated to outweigh their utility. Traded goods become traded
bads.

9

Beginning around the time of the establishment of the United Nations (UN) Global
Compact two decades ago, global corporations have sought to internalize environmental and
social factors into corporate supply chains. Such private standard setting shapes international
trade as standards have always done. But government action to influence such standard-setting
transforms private action into government measures that can become a legal issue within the
trading system.
The fourth threat is to question the equity of international trade both inside a domestic
economy and/or between national economies. As noted above, trade makes participants better
off, but may make some bystanders worse off. Such distributional consequences on individuals
can cumulate into negative impact on particular groups like business sectors, local communities,
workers grouped by education, and workers grouped by race or sex. When those effects are
characterized as an “injustice” caused by trade, then the social costs of trade may seem high
relative to the social benefits.
In theory, the most tangible of the private costs of trade are susceptible to compensation
via focused government policies paid for by some of the value added from trade.6 Among the
oldest of such compensation programs is the idea of trade adjustment assistance for workers.
Unfortunately, a lot of the efforts at delivering worker adjustment assistance have been carried
out poorly over the past half-century. Moreover, when market effects on individuals are falsely
attributed to trade (e.g., misattributing to trade the social costs of technological change), then
even the gains from trade may not be high enough to compensate for those misattributed
technology costs. Without a “social contract” to assure that the market does not get the last word

6

Steve Charnovitz, “Worker Adjustment: The Missing Ingredient in Trade Policy,” California Management Review,
1986.
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on allocating the benefits of commerce, both open trade and trade agreements will suffer
headwinds.
The fifth threat is to question the national security implications of trade. As with many
of the arguments against trade, this patriotic argument goes back decades and in some ways
centuries. Transborder commercial intercourse by definition involves interdependence between
countries and that interdependence itself may be said to cause national insecurity. In reality,
security is hardly fructified by a tactic of economic isolation or import substitution. Mutual
dependence between countries in general does not undermine national security.
Yet even within a frame of open trade, a valid concern exists about the composition of
exports — that is, one can worry that the exports of certain goods or technology from one
country to another will strengthen foreign adversaries by providing access to those goods or
technology. So, export controls can be justified. Yet this policy can have unintended
consequences. Any program of export controls can boomerang by incentivizing homegrown
innovation in the targeted country -- necessity being one mother of invention.
The obverse claim that an open flow of imports weakens the security of an importing
nation (rather than promoting resilience) is far less plausible. If the imported good or service or
technology is itself harmful, such as imported armaments or imported blueprints for biological
weapons, then, of course, border controls would be justified. But if the import restraint is
promoted merely to maintain the competitivity of a particular domestic industry, then any such
restraint is simply protectionism disguised as a “national security strategy.”
Nowadays, disguise has become unnecessary. One of the trade policy triumphs of the
Trump Administration has been to revive the idea of controlling imports for ostensibly “national
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security” reasons through the notorious Section 232 program.7 This is a dangerous doctrine in a
world trading system because if any import can be subject to a new layer of tariffs in the
furtherance of any industrial policy, then the “security and predictability” benefit from signing
on to the trading system will be lost. The Trump Administration has also re-energized the US
Defense Production Act (DPA) which authorizes the President to intervene in US markets so as
to commandeer private sector production for expansively defined “defense” purposes. Recourse
to the DPA will not cease after the Trump Administration.
Once the concept of “national security” is made so elastic as to include “economic
security” or “human security,” then national industrial policies can be pursued willy-nilly for any
“security-sensitive” sector (e.g., steel, automobiles, computer chips, artificial intelligence, etc.).
Such policies can include the traditional instruments of protectionism, as well as instruments of
subsidy, regulation, and government procurement. Favored domestic companies or sectors can be
succored and their foreign competitors hobbled. To recover from the ravages of Covid-19,
leading governments can be expected to erect massive “rescue programs” that may fail to be
trade neutral. Demands for “just in case” supply chain indigenization and maintenance of
“critical” domestic infrastructure are being voiced under a banner of economic/health security.
Although WTO rules contain disciplines on subsidies and discriminatory regulation,
governments retain considerable autonomy to use policy to shape competition in “future
technologies,” “key industries” and “national champions.” A proponent of world public order
can imagine international negotiations to effectuate codes governing industrial policy that would
maintain control over and stay ahead of government programs to “pick winners.” The reality

7

My colleagues and I tried but failed to get US courts to declare Section 232 unconstitutional. Naomi Jagoda,
“Supreme Court declines to hear case challenging Trump’s steel tariffs,” The Hill (22 June 2020).
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though is that no intergovernmental efforts to manage that sort of competition between leading
governments is likely to be successful or even attempted.
While the WTO contains rules that may intersect with national security concerns, WTO
rules are silent about any obligation of a WTO Member government to refrain from seeking to
topple the security or autonomy of another WTO Member. Consider various national policies in
place against WTO Members Ukraine, Russia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Cuba, and Venezuela. The
WTO may encourage good trade relations between Members, but the WTO does not require it.
The sixth threat is the geopolitical imbalance caused by trade. This claim differs from
the security threat in not being premised on the particular goods, services, or technology
involved. Instead, the claim is broader: that because trade strengthens nations, countries that are
the most successful participants in the world economy may get disproportionately powerful in
relation to other countries. Just as particular companies can get too big and powerful within a
domestic economy, particular countries can get so big that they wield too much power over the
world economy. Moreover, when a great power can be said to exhibit predatory intent, then
arguments can arise to “decouple” from or erect a “silicon curtain” against that state. Without
any legal mechanisms to “break up” large national economies enjoying overweening power, we
are left with only the classic architecture seeking mutual security through a multipolar “balance
of power.”8
In contemporary politics, there is a loud chorus against China centered on the fact that
China is politically authoritarian (indeed communist). Yet if China were fully democratic and
pursued the exact same policies of state capitalism (or state mercantilism) and hegemony, then
the alleged geostrategic dangers would seem to be just as great. Although China may be the
8

I have benefited from the thoughtful essay “Geopolitics and trade” by Marko Papic (Hinrich Foundation, Nov.
2020).
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most demonized of the superpowers, the United States sets a bad example in swinging its
disproportionate economic power to “make America great” and to prescribe outcomes in other
countries. The centrality of the dollar in the world economy is an enabler of aggressive US
extraterritorial regulation.
These six threats impale the open trade paradigm. The intellectual foundation for the
world economy is the idea that trade between two countries makes both countries better off.
This positive-sum paradigm is challenged with the six concerns/threats discussed above. With the
fairness, national security, and geopolitical threats, the paradigm can degrade to viewing trade as
zero-sum with some countries benefiting at the expense of others. Yet with some of the other
threats, such as moral or ecological concerns, the paradigm can invert to seeing trade as
negative-sum for participating countries.
In their private lives, consumers see and enjoy the myriad benefits of international trade.
Yet in their public lives, consumers as citizens are sometimes swayed by politicians and interest
groups to oppose international trade for any of the six reasons discussed above. Particular
individuals may find some of these reasons compelling while rejecting the others. Yet with six
varieties of anti-trade dogma to choose from, there will be multiple ways for open trade ideals to
be undermined in public opinion.
Trade actions by governments can be classified as defensive or proactive. The typical
defensive trade action pursues “fairness” or “industrial policy” objectives. Tariffs are the central
instrument to level the playing field in the name of fairness and to unlevel the playing field in the
name of industrial policy. Proactive trade actions occur when trade instruments are used as
leverage in foreign policy or when trade negotiations are sought to promote market openness in
other countries. Import or export restrictions (or other origin-based measures) are a longtime
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tool of foreign policy, especially in a large, meddlesome polity like the United States. The
foreign policy purpose can be for any reason: human rights, sustainable development,
safeguarding investment, etc. When the U.S. government uses an import restriction to protect
the environment in a foreign country (such as an import ban on elephant ivory or on shrimp to
protect turtles), such action should be labeled as “environmental policy” rather than “trade
policy.” Yet however labeled, measures applying to trade used in an outwardly-directed way to
induce outcomes for a foreign country are governed by WTO rules.
Today’s crippled WTO is especially vulnerable to these six threats. To be sure, the
epistemic community of international trade has always been aware of these six threats. They are
hardly novel. Leading trade scholars have analyzed these claims for decades. For example in
1981, Richard Blackhurst called attention to trends in overlapping of domestic and international
economic policies.9 Also in 1981, C. Fred Bergsten founded what is now called the Peterson
Institute for International Economics (PIIE) to carry out comprehensive research on the multiple
dimensions of international economic policy. All six of these threats have been explored in PIIE
research projects over the years.10 In 1989, John H. Jackson called attention to the trade
“interface” features of the GATT that allowed countries with different economic systems to
enjoy the mutual benefits of the trading system.11 Jackson appreciated that an economy does not
have to be capitalist to seek to benefit from international trade. In 1996, Jagdish Bhagwati and
Robert E. Hudec led an interdisciplinary scholarly project to dissect several “fairness” claims in

9

Richard Blackhurst, “The Twilight of Domestic Economic Policies”, The World Economy (1981).

10

The PIIE is now led ably by Adam Posen who continues the Institute’s leading role in thinking through complex
trade issues.
11

John H. Jackson, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (1989).
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the international trade debate.12 By the early 21st century, most new contributions to trade law
scholarship addressed at least one of these six claims.
All six claims have been part of the discourse in and around the WTO and several of
them have been addressed in WTO Doha Round negotiations and in WTO dispute settlement.
WTO rules contain various exceptions and carveouts than can be said to provide “policy space”
for these six concerns. On the environment, both GATT and the General Agreement on Trade in
Service (GATS) contain health exceptions; the GATT contains a natural resources exception.
On certain fairness claims, the trading system provides countervailing duties, antidumping
duties, subsidy disciplines, intellectual property disciplines, nondiscrimination rules, and
carveouts for some commodity agreements. On moral claims, the GATT, the GATS, and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) contain a moral
exception. On domestic equity, no WTO norm exists, although back in the early years of the
WTO, there was a carve-out for domestic subsidies to “disadvantaged regions.” On intercountry equity or “global inequality”, there are many WTO rules meant to favor developing and
least developed counties. On national security, the GATT, the GATS, and the TRIPS Agreement
contain security exceptions. On geopolitical imbalance, WTO rules are silent reflecting the state
centricity of the WTO and international law generally. Yet the unique WTO accession
negotiations do provide opportunities for incumbent members to impose WTO-plus obligations
on particular WTO-applicant countries. Looking back to 1947, one can see that trade rules have
been written, modified, and elastically interpreted in ways that provide flexibility for addressing
all six concerns/threats.

12
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But now, one wonders whether these six fundamental concerns about trade have grown
so large that they can no longer be finessed or assimilated into the WTO legal system Some
limit surely exists for how many exceptions can be loaded onto the camel’s back and how many
holes a piece of Swiss cheese can accommodate. Even worse, when the United States accuses
China of “unfair” investment and regulatory practices, but rather than use neutral WTO tribunals
instead acts unilaterally to impose trade sanctions on China, such misbehavior by the United
States cannot possibly be squared with WTO norms. At a certain point, the game of WTO rules
is rendered unworth the candle.
The six threats/concerns laid out in this essay implicate a huge swath of international
trade. If one were to add up all international trade that could be said to infringe upon the
environment, fairness to competitors, public morals, social justice, a nation’s security, or big
power relations, what percent of global international trade would remain innocent? I have not
seen any data, but my guess is not much.
Starting in the late 19th century, the trends in globalization and technological change have
transformed more economic activity into international issues and international problems.
Leading governments have responded by seeking to construct needed international rules. Two
world wars interrupted progress and then afterwards enabled progress. This transnational
normative process received significant intellectual aid from future-thinking nongovernmental
organizations. The metaphors “spaceship Earth” and “our global neighborhood” captured the
imagination of generations of internationalists.13
Solving global problems often requires focused international policies and sometimes
specialized international agencies to administer such policies. During the 21st century, the
13

Barbara Ward, SPACESHIP EARTH (1966); The Commission on Global Governance, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD (1995).
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growth in international problems has not been matched by a growth in international solutions.
The faltering of the trading system is one example of that mismatch, but the same pathology
exists in many areas of global governance.
International rules are used to correct market failure, but such rules are also employed to
correct “government failure.”14 Although there is, to some extent, an “invisible hand” in the
market that can render self-interested individual behavior socially beneficial, there is no invisible
hand in the global polity that can render selfish national governmental action beneficial for the
world, especially with problems that overlap borders. This is not to deny the self-evident truth
that nations should pursue their own national interest. But the national interest needs to be
calculated in an enlightened way that respects the legal obligations of a state in treaty and
customary international law. Attentiveness to science is also vital especially on issues where
international legal obligations do not exist.

Environmental Policy and the Trading System
Over the years, I have participated in numerous academic and policy projects wherein I
wrote about how to promote the mutual compatibility of environmental protection and the
trading system. Those various exercises took place under the auspices of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1993), the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (1995), the Aspen Global Change Institute (1995), the International
Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (1996); the Yale Center for Environmental Law &

14

See Steve Charnovitz, “Addressing Government Failure Through International Financial Law," Journal of
International Economic Law (2010).

18

Policy (1997)15, the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (1998), Columbia University
(1999), the Pew Center on Global Climate Change (2003), the United Nations University (2008),
the Peterson Institute for International Economics (2009), the University of British Columbia
Faculty of Law (2013), the World Bank (2014), and the Yale Center for Environmental Law &
Policy (2019). Not every study was centered on combatting climate change, but most where.
Looking back at those projects, all of them adhered to a similar assumption of accepting
the precepts of the international trading system and analyzing how adjustments could be made
within the system to achieve the duals goals of trade liberalization and environmental protection.
In other words, the international trading system was viewed as an exogenous legal constraint for
which the environment and climate regimes should seek mutual harmony. Today, the time may
be ripe for a deeper dive.
Do Earth’s serious environmental problems call for a clean-green slate, that is, a zerobased approach to international trade and trade rules? If it is true that the planet’s economy
needs to be reorganized and revitalized at a fundamental level to address the existential
challenges of climate change, what types of international trade practices are consistent with those
environmental imperatives? Through such an analysis, the role of international trade and
international trade institutions would be viewed as endogenous to constructing a new model for
how the inhabitants on Planet Earth should organize clean production, consumption, and
exchange.
In the early 20th century, John Muir taught that “When we try to pick out anything by
itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the Universe.” Several decades ago, Barry

15

In several instances, I co-authored studies. For example in 1997, UNEP Executive Director Elizabeth Dowdeswell
and I co-authored the essay “Globalization, Trade, and Interdependence” in Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty
(eds), THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: BUILDING THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Yale University Press, 1997).
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Commoner reminded us that “Everything is connected to everything else.” Nevertheless, even
while recognizing the complex linkages within the ecolonomy, analysts can still usefully
distinguish baskets of issues.
Our global environmental challenges can be divided into two main baskets — nature
and industry. The first basket comprises the policy improvements needed to sustain and
regenerate living resources in the skies, on land, and in the seas. The second basket comprises
the policy improvements needed to reduce pollution and waste from production and
consumption in order to achieve clean air, clean water, a safe human habitat, and atmospheric
stability.
The challenges with nature are caused by insensate human activity. In the Hebrew
Bible, mankind is told “to keep” the garden and to have “dominion over the fish of the sea and
over the birds of the heavens.” But mankind has not exercised this stewardship in a responsible
way. Appropriate environmental policies are needed for sustainable agriculture, management
of regenerative resources such as forests, and conservation of biodiversity including the
biosphere within the “sovereignty” of particular countries. When a failure in conservation
occurs, then remedial and restorative policies should be actuated to the extent that they are
technically feasible.
The challenges with industrial pollution can degrade the life, health, and satisfaction of
humans. (Pollution also affects animals and plants.) Unlike nature, much of which exists
outside the market, industrial activities exist in the market, and yet a market failure allows the
costs of pollution to be externalized. In theory, government regulatory (and tax) policy can
correct such ongoing market failures (e.g., with a “polluter pays” principle). Yet a transnational
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market is not well suited to correction via inconsistent national policies. Past market failures
can be cleaned up within technical limits, but doing so will typically require public spending (or
public investment). In the real world, governments sometimes have a hard time finding public
resources to fix long-festering problems.
Once the optimal remedial policies for nature and industry are identified, there should
be an inquiry as to the ways that international trade contributes to supporting those policies
and the ways that international trade hinders achieving those policies. Such an inquiry is
amenable to both theoretical and empirical analysis. One can start by considering what impact
domestic commerce has on achieving environmental solutions. With that answer as a baseline,
one can then consider what differences ensue when traders are distant from each other or
when traders operate in different countries with asymmetric political and economic systems.
The commonplace that climate change is an “existential” crisis implies that rapid and
strong remedial actions are needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to re-engineer the
atmosphere if feasible so as to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial
levels. Emission reduction is needed in all sectors — especially energy and food production.
Transitioning out of fossil fuels, stepping up of reforestation, and deploying carbon capture
technologies can each play important roles. If all countries implemented all of these programs
with equal dedication, the dangers of climate change could possibly be averted. Yet on Earth,
governments sometimes fail to act cooperatively to rapidly address global problems. The
achievements of environmental governance over the past century demonstrate that effective
environmental regimes are essential for managing ecological problems and that such regimes
are not always in place.
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Although the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992 provided
a good start for the climate regime, the international efforts since then have been
disappointing. The minimalist design of the Paris Agreement neglects many of the lessons
learned from successful regimes that are based on reciprocal commitments on the domestic
policy instruments to be used (or not used) and means for enforcing those commitments. The
champions of the non-binding, rules-free Paris Agreement seem to believe that its pot luck style
will prove effective. But I dissent from the proposition that we should bet the planet on it.16
As countries carry out bottom-up climate actions, the question of trade has and will
arise in climate debates.17 Should a climate-ambitious government accept business-as-usual
trade relations with less ambitious governments? Can a country that imposes climate taxes and
regulations on its own producers compete fairly with producers in countries that do not? If a
country is controlling emissions in domestic production, then how can it stay open to imported
goods that are not produced under conditions of equivalent emission control? Should
international trade itself be subject to an atmosphere use tax?
I call these the “tradeclimate” questions.18 To the extent that domestic debates on
tradeclimate questions make intellectual contributions, so much the better. But when those
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domestic debates lead to self-help trade measures based on the “carbon content” of imports,
then such unilateral actions will profoundly impact trade relations.
In contemporary debates about reforming the WTO and trade law, a mantra has arisen
that the WTO should expand its wheelhouse to take on climate policy as a way of making the
WTO more politically sustainable and making international trade more environmentally
sustainable. But changing the contours of the WTO in this way is a bad idea for several reasons:
First, the trade bureaucrats serving in and around the WTO are ill-suited to make climate policy.
Second, climate policy should be designed in a regime where science reigns, and trade policy is
hardly based on science. Third, the specialized mission of the trading system to promote nondiscriminatory and open markets is itself vital to economic progress; giving the WTO a diverging
mission will impede the WTO. Fourth, the WTO is too state-centric and untransparent to the
key social and economic actors needed to formulate climate change solutions, particularly the
business community, environmental NGOs, and subnational governments.
But how can it be that the WTO should not try to solve the tradeclimate problems? The
answer is that the solution to those problems is inherent in achieving an effective climate
regime. Several decades ago, the respected 20th century environmentalist Konrad von Moltke
taught us that “unmanaged environmental problems become trade problems.” 19 But the locus
for managing environmental problems should remain the designated environmental regime.
If the climate regime is not addressing the tradeclimate problems, then it should get its
act together to do so. Go back to the drawing board in Paris (or Glasgow), not in Geneva.
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Seeking to delegate the tradeclimate issues to the WTO is illogical because they are
fundamentally environmental issues, not trade issues.
Once the climate regime figures out the best way to handle tradeclimate issues, then
the WTO can adapt its rules to confer recognition to that “multilaterally determined” outcome.
Some might worry that the WTO might not be able to grant recognition to environmental law
because WTO decisionmaking is consensus-based. Yet the practice of making progress by
consensus is widely used in treatymaking (including climate treatymaking) and this approach to
legitimacy is a feature not a bug. Moreover, while the WTO typically relies on consensus, the
WTO constitution does contain some mechanisms for making decisions without a consensus.20
These mechanisms will not work if a major economy objects, but they would work if a club of all
major economies agreed to solutions in the climate regime and then sought to export those
decisions into WTO law.
In calling for this approach, I do not suggest that environmental policy or trade policy
should be formulated without regard for each other. Certainly, complementarity is needed on
all issues of governance. For example, I have always supported the WTO initiatives to address
fishery subsidies that are harmful both to fisheries and to trade. But for the difficult
tradeclimate issues, it would be wrong for the trading system to get in over its head. Of course,
it will not be easy for the major governmental players in climate policymaking to nail down a
workable solution to the tricky tradeclimate choices. But that is right road for nations to take.
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The danger we face is that powerful governments are attracted to a darker road, that is,
prescribing “nationally-determined” regulations or taxes that can be imposed on the import
trade. Indeed, applying a US carbon tax to US imports is much more politically popular than
applying a carbon tax within the US domestic economy. Indeed, as I have noted for many years
in lectures I give on climate change, while I cannot predict what regulatory approach the US
Congress will eventually settle on to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, I can confidently predict
that the US Congress will include border measures.
As an aside, this essay notes that the same principle of functional specialization should
be applied to the worker right issues that some have sought add to the WTO’s remit.21 No
doubt it is true that governments should “endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane
conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all
countries to which their industrial and commercial relations extend…”22, but this Wilsonian era
concept is best pursued by the functional international organization that Wilson himself
championed and helped to create over a century ago — the International Labour Organization
(ILO).23 If better international rules are needed to bring social justice to international trade,
then ask the ILO to write those rules; don’t ask the WTO. Unlike the WTO’s decisionmaking
bodies which comprise only trade ministry officials, the ILO’s decisionmaking bodies comprise
not just governmental officials, but also private sector employer and worker representatives.
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Although the ILO is also competent on all employment policy issues, I would
nevertheless favor a WTO role in responding to the social deficits from international trade. As I
noted above regarding the creation of the post-war trading system in 1948, the original concept
did seek to embed a social commitment on job creation and economic development. In 2020,
we enjoy a great deal of soft law and financing on employment issues that did not exist in 1948.
Nevertheless, as I have written on multiple occasions over many decades24, the trading system
should circle back to these first principles and consider ways that international rules can be
helpful to domestic governments in assuring that dislocated workers injured by international
trade receive the help they need to recover.
Finally, a brief word about the WTO ‘s agenda for 2021. The trade war between China
and the United States spills into the WTO,25 but the WTO should not pull itself into the march of
folly. Just as the WTO should not take on a new task of combatting global warming or
strengthening worker rights, the WTO should not take on a new task of re-educating China.
Actually, the WTO got a shot at inculcating better practices in China in the early 2000s when the
WTO negotiated China’s accession into the WTO and imposed on China numerous obligations
more stringent than baseline WTO law.26 Looking back to 2001, with a healthy serving of
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revisionism, one might conclude that the WTO proved to be a poor trade negotiator vis-à-vis
China. But now that China is a longtime Member of the WTO, with all the rights and privileges
of membership, the WTO should not disfavor (or favor) China. Indeed, gaining cooperation by
China will be critical to making needed progress in all international agencies including the WTO,
the Paris Agreement, and the World Health Organization (WHO).
In my view, China is perfectly entitled to challenge U.S. influence in a peaceful way.
Rather than emulating some of China’s worst nonmarket behavior, the United States and its
democratic allies should seek to lead the world through initiatives for broadly shared
prosperity. A generous plan for global distribution of Covid-19 vaccines to developing countries
would be a good place to start.27
The doomed Doha Development Round launched by the WTO in 2001 has failed, but
all28 of the issues in that Round would resurface in any new multilateral negotiation. From my
perspective, the top priorities29 in a new WTO negotiation should include: (1) reducing
agricultural subsidies by high-income countries, (2) reducing barriers to trade in environmental
goods and services, (3) reducing barriers to trade in medical supplies, medical equipment, and
medicines, (4) writing needed rules for e-commerce (digital trade), and (5) fixing the flaws that
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have arisen in the administration of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM Agreement). The caselaw of the WTO shows numerous challenges against
WTO-illegal government subsidies including two very large arbitral awards against the United
States (each over $3.9 billion annually). Since China became a member of the WTO almost 20
years ago, not a single case against China has been lodged alleging a Chinese government
subsidy that violates SCM rules.
In recent days, an initiative has arisen in the WTO to waive patent protection for Covid19 vaccines.30 Such an initiative is a terrible idea. To be sure, our longtime method for
incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation and pricing the fruits of research is fundamentally
flawed. Radical reform is required, but not by waiving patent protection.
The market for pharmaceuticals is wacky. If a medicine works, then it should be
available to everyone who could benefit from it. This can only be achieved by having a wellendowed global mechanism that can step in to purchase pharmaceutical patents at a reasonable
price. That price has to be high enough to reward success by providing incentives to innovate in
research processes that often end in failure. Such a social price cannot be a “market” price
because a true market does not exist independent of governmental health programs. Once the
innovating pharmaceutical companies are properly compensated,31 then they can produce the
drug for distribution to the world. This method would obviate the enabling of generic drug
production as a legitimate form of competition with all of the ensuing trade and health
distortions. The costs of proper compensation to pharmaceutical companies would be fiscally
expensive.
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Certainly, the pathologies of the current pharmaceutical pricing model are not caused by
the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement. So, one not should look to the WTO to take the lead in fixing our
flawed arrangements. Yet the TRIPS Agreement does present a stumbling block toward rational
reform because TRIPS Article 31(h) recognizes compulsory licensing of patents with very weak
protections for innovators.32 In particular, the TRIPS Agreement sets the standard of “adequate
remuneration in the circumstances of each case.” No WTO caselaw exists on how high the
remuneration has to be to be “adequate.” From the negotiating history and national practice one
can infer the absence of any common understanding that, as a minimum, the remuneration ought
to be set in the same ballpark as the profits that are normally derived from blockbuster drugs.

A Roadmap for Progress
International trade faces significant political challenges. This essay lays out the six-part
narrative that is undermining intellectual support for open trade – namely, ecology, level playing
field fairness, morality, equity, security, and geopolitics. As I finish this essay, I have taken note
of the G20 Riyadh Summit Leaders’ Declaration pledging to “continue to work to ensure a level
playing field to foster an enabling business environment.“33
The WTO has been rocked by these developments and cannot just pick itself up and dust
itself off in our Covid-shell-shocked world economy. The Trump Administration is blameworthy
for the WTO’s ongoing constitutional failures, but the problems go deeper than Trump.
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Unfortunately, the isolationist impulse in American politics that I have termed “American
Rejectionism”34 will not be cleansed away by the 2020 US elections.
Yet alongside the WTO’s failures (and perhaps because of the WTO’s failures), regional
trade negotiations continue to blossom. Everyone agrees on a need for “WTO reform,” but no
consensus exists on the details of reform. In my view, the biggest flaw in the WTO is not that it
is too brutal on national volition, but rather that it is too gentle. WTO law needs stronger
disciplines for both market and nonmarket economies. In thinking about what country can lead
reform, I note that the government (the United States) that has been the most critical of the WTO
for being feckless is the government that has been the biggest WTO rule-breaker as measured by
losses within WTO tribunals.
The first step toward solving these six challenges to world trade is to recognize them as
independent intellectual challenges. None of them have easy fixes and none of them are fully
addressable through current WTO rules. More inclusive dialogue within the WTO (and the
OECD) can be helpful in thinking through each of these threats all of which permeate into
domestic policy space. For some of these threats, other international regimes need to raise their
games. The biggest underperformer is the Paris Agreement which is routinely glorified as a
landmark accomplishment.
The climate change challenges facing the world economy should be quickly and
effectively addressed. The proper place to center action is in the climate regime and its timid
Paris Agreement. Seeking to use the WTO as a substitute for an improved Paris Agreement is
barking up the wrong rain forest. Still, many opportunities exist for the WTO to make a useful
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contribution to combating climate change. To help address the first of the six threats, the WTO
should provide more policy space for subsidies to promote decarbonization.35
Because I have written extensively on the governance dilemmas within the trading
system,36 I will not address those issues except to note that the current plight of the WTO has
punctured the myth of “WTO exceptionalism.” By WTO exceptionalism, I mean the self-image
within the WTO “House” that it operates in a separate sphere from other international regimes
because WTO rules are “enforceable” rather than being merely aspirational or voluntary.37 The
WTO is clearly different in a lot of ways from the WHO or the Conference of the Parties (COP)
to the UNFCCC. Yet all specialized international governing mechanisms share the same
common purpose and challenge. The common purpose is to promote better outcomes for a world
of cooperating and competing nation states. The common challenge is to do so using rules and
monitoring more than carrots and sticks.
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